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Abstract—Industrial control systems (ICS) are managed re-
motely with the help of dedicated protocols that were originally
designed to work in walled gardens. Many of these protocols have
been adapted to Internet transport and support wide-area com-
munication. ICS now exchange insecure traffic on an inter-domain
level, putting at risk not only common critical infrastructure, but
also the Internet ecosystem (e.g., DRDoS attacks).
In this paper, we uncover unprotected inter-domain ICS traffic
at two central Internet vantage points, an IXP and an ISP.
This traffic analysis is correlated with data from honeypots and
Internet-wide scans to separate industrial from non-industrial
ICS traffic. We provide an in-depth view on Internet-wide ICS
communication. Our results can be used (i) to create precise
filters for potentially harmful non-industrial ICS traffic, and (ii)
to detect ICS sending unprotected inter-domain ICS traffic, being
vulnerable to eavesdropping and traffic manipulation attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICS) are used to monitor and
control industrial environments. Deployments can range from
a few controllers in a factory to large distributed systems that
monitor critical infrastructures. The underlying ICS communi-
cation is based on specialized, often proprietary protocols.
Originally, ICS protocols were designed to operate in closed
environments, which do not require authentication and encryp-
tion. The lack of security features in ICS protocols remained
largely unnoticed due to the deployment in isolated (trusted)
environments. This changed recently when ICS protocols have
been stacked onto IP, enabling the management of ICS con-
trollers via the global Internet. Such communication requires
protective measures, either via secure tunnels between trusted
domains or end-to-end authentication and encryption. Visible
(unencrypted) ICS traffic is particularly dangerous since it is
prone to eavesdropping and manipulation attacks, see Figure 1.
Traffic traces hint attackers to potentially open ICS services
without the need to perform suspicious scans of IP addresses.
In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive analysis
of the visibility of unprotected ICS traffic across network
domains. In contrast to previous work [1], [2] which reveals
reachable ICS services, we explore the communication of
the whole ICS ecosystem, from the ICS controllers to the
management stations. We show that ICS systems are controlled
remotely without any protective mechanisms, harming both the
Internet as well as the industrial infrastructure. In detail, our
contributions are the following.
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Figure 1: Analyzing unprotected ICS protocols.
1) We present the first analysis of inter-domain ICS traffic
at two central Internet vantage points, an Internet Ex-
change Point and an Internet Service Provider, covering
6 months.
2) We find new unprotected ICS deployments which are
undetected by recent scan projects.
3) We classify industrial and non-industrial ICS traffic based
on cross-correlations with other data sources such as
honeypots.
4) We assess common tools for implementing our proposed
methodology to allow for future long-term monitoring
and mitigation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II presents background and related work about ICS proto-
cols. Section III introduces our methodology and data sources
to identeify ICS traffic. Section IV presents basic properties
of ICS traffic seen at IXP and ISP vantage points. Section V
proposes a method to separate industrial and non-industrial
ICS traffic. Section VI analyzes industrial ICS traffic in detail.
Section VII concludes with an outlook.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. A Glimpse into ICS Protocol Security
ICS protocols are deployed in four major application areas
[2]: (i) process automation, (ii) building management, (iii)
smart grids including power plants, and (iv) metering infras-
tructures, see Table I. All of these scenarios require security
support when the ICS devices are interconnected via untrusted
networks.
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Table I: Overview of ICS Protocols. [ND/HD: Normal/Heuristic Dissector, C: Censys, S: Shodan, R: Rapid7, K: Kudelski]
Wirshark Min. # Bytes to Scan Honeypot #
Standard / Protocol Ports Use Case Dissectors identify protocol Projects Software CVEs
Modbus 502 Process automation ND 74 B C/S/K 3 23
Siemens S7 102 Process automation HD 93 B C/S 3 7
EthernetIP 2221, 2222, 44818 Process automation ND 74 B S 3 9
BACnet 47808-47823 Building management ND 46 B C/S/R/K 3 7
DNP3 20000 Smart grids ND/HD 62 B C/S 8 39
HART IP 5094 Process automation ND 78 B S 8 6
IEC60870-5-104 2404 Smart grids ND 76 B S (8) 0
ANSI C12.22 1153 Metering ND n/a 8 8 0
OMRON FINS 9600 Process automation ND 54 B S 8 7
IEC61850 (mms) 102 Smart grids ND/HD 144 B 8 8 0
Codesys 2455 Smart grids 8 S 8 20
GE-SRTP 18245, 18246 Process automation 8 S 8 7
Niagara Fox 1911, 4911 Building management 8 C/S/K 8 5
MELSEC-Q 5006, 5007 Process automation 8 S 8 2
ProConOS 20547 Process automation 8 S 8 1
PCWorx 1926 Process automation 8 S 8 0
Crimson 789 Process automation 8 S 8 0
ICCP-TASE.2 102 Smart grids 8 8 8 8
Vulnerable ICS deployments have been highlighted since
several years [3], [4]. The first reported incident is an unau-
thorized manipulation of an ICS which led to a pipeline
explosion back in 1982 [5]. Although the absolute number of
reported ICS incidents is fairly low [5], a single incident can
be hazardous. To understand and improve the protection of ICS
deployments, multiple efforts have been undertaken, including
(i) the development of honeypots, (ii) Internet-wide scans to
find open ICS devices, (iii) the improvement of intrusion
detection systems for ICS, and (iv) the modelling and surveying
of the ICS ecosystem.
ICS specific honeypots have been developed [6]–[8] to un-
derstand the origin, frequency, and sophistication of attacks on
ICS services. ICS services are popular victims. ICS honeypots
receive significantly more requests after being listed on public
scanning sites such as Shodan [9].
Two well-known scan projects, Censys and Shodan, detect
globally reachable ICS services [1], [2]. Bodenheim [1] showed
that his honeypot captured the Shodan search engine within
19 days. Mirian et al. [2] measured the increase of open ICS
services of up to 20 % in 4 months.
Dedicated intrusion detection systems (e.g., for smart me-
ters [10]) and extensions to common IDS tools (e.g., Snort and
Bro [11], [12]) have been proposed. Valdes [13] introduced a
security architecture that monitors ICS traffic for irregular pat-
terns. Taking into account recent, distributed ICS deployments,
Zhang [14] proposed a distributed multi-layered system.
ICS systems have been surveyed in several publications
introducing historical background, taxonomies, and current
security vulnerabilities [15]–[19]. The number of Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) entries for ICS im-
plementations grows steadily. New vulnerabilities are often
discovered by simple fuzzing techniques [20], [21]. A recent
ICS measurement study assessed the DDoS potential of BAC-
net by analysing IXP and ISP packet samples over a period
of 48 hours [22]. Yet, still open is a longitudinal analysis
of unprotected ICS communication deployed in the global
Internet.
B. The Problem of Unprotected ICS Protocols
Most of the common ICS protocols lack protection by design
and are susceptible to eavesdropping and traffic manipulation
attacks. The only exception is Niagara Fox, which provides
authentication. However, authentication alone is insufficient.
Attackers can scout their target and prepare a targeted attack
without communicating with the ICS devices at all. Recent
malware [23] exploits passive recording of ICS traffic travers-
ing small enterprise routers. Such eavesdropping of unprotected
ICS traffic is also possible on the inter-domain level.
Furthermore, it is important to note that infrastructure-based
protections such as firewalls or NAT only partially help. They
may prevent discovering ICS devices by active scanning but do
not protect against passive listening and spoofed replay attacks.
In this paper, we analyze the highly vulnerable part of the
ICS ecosystem; those cases where operators interconnect their
systems without any protection. This is challenging because
unprotected industrial ICS traffic is suppressed by noise such
as scan traffic.
C. ICS Scans Seen from an Internet Telescope
To motivate our aim for a detailed classification of ICS
traffic, we briefly analyse data from the CAIDA/UCSD network
telescope. This data source captures backscatter traffic from
randomly spoofed DDoS attacks or Internet-wide scans of
the /8 CAIDA/UCSD darknet. Any incoming traffic to the
telescope is inter-domain and non-industrial.
Figure 2 shows the daily activity for Modbus (TCP/502),
measured at the telescope. There is almost no activity visible
until the beginning of 2014. Then, the amount of destination IP
addresses that received data on the Modbus port increased by
three orders of magnitude. The number of source IP addresses
that sent data to the telescope increased by roughly one order
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Figure 2: Internet-wide scanning of Modbus (TCP/502) ob-
served at the CAIDA/UCSD network telescope. We highlight
research activities around one of the most common ICS scan-
ners.
of magnitude, indicating scanning from a small set of hosts.
The sudden upturn in scan activities can be explained by (i)
increased media coverage of ICS systems and (ii) increased
research interest and consequently publicly available scan tools.
Our observations correlate with the start of the ZMap and
Censys projects.
This brief analysis does not only highlights the increasing
interest in ICS protocols but also the need for a careful
methodology to analyse ICS traffic.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF ICS TRAFFIC
Two challenges needs to be tackled for analyzing inter-
domain ICS traffic. First, we need to reliably identify ICS
traffic in global packet traces. Second, we need to distinguish
industrial from non-industrial (e.g., scanning) ICS traffic. In
this section, we propose our methodology to solve the first
challenge, and tackle the second challenge in Section V.
A. Collecting Traffic at Central Internet Vantage Points
We passively collect traffic at two different Internet vantage
points, an IXP and an ISP. The two data source allow us to
inspect traffic from two different perspectives, a rich intercon-
nection fabric and an upstream provider.
Internet exchange Points (IXP) are centralized network in-
frastructures where heterogeneous domains intertwine. Due
to the large traffic volume, flow data is not fully recorded
but selectively sampled. We analyse non-anonymized packets
collected from October 2017 until April 2018 with a sample
rate of ∼ 214. The sampled packets are truncated after 128
bytes. Flows from an IXP are inherently inter-domain.
Our second data source is the Measurement and Analysis on
the WIDE Internet (MAWI) archive [24]. This archive contains
daily traces describing 15 minutes of full traffic captures from a
transpacific Internet link between Japan and the United States.
We received a private MAWI data set with non-anonymized IP
addresses and payload (96 bytes) for the same time range.
Table II: Effects of data sanitization process and the ratio of
remaining ICS packets by vantage point.
Remaining Packets
IXP ISP
Sanitizing steps after Wireshark ICS detection 100% 100%
Ê Removal of tunnel packets 99% 99%
Ë Removal of malformed packets 15% 52%
Ì Removal of NDPI fingerprintable packets 14% 51%
Comparison with vanilla approach
Port-based detection relative to Wireshark 3950% 1340%
B. Identifying ICS Traffic Candidates
We explicitly do not want to implement new traffic classifiers
as this conflicts with maintainability and reproducibility on the
long-term. Instead of this, we want to leverage existing tools.
We use Wireshark dissectors to find ICS traffic candidates. Half
of the ICS protocols can be dissected by Wireshark, as shown in
Table I. Wireshark distinguishes between normal and heuristic
dissectors (ND, HD). Normal dissectors identify protocols
based on well-known port numbers and check whether the
packets comply with simple sanity checks. If they fail, they
forward the data to heuristic dissectors which apply pattern
matching on protocol fields.
To verify the correctness of the Wireshark dissectors, we
apply them on public ground truth data [25] and manually
inspect the dissection of packet headers. All dissectors except
one work accurately and map operation codes to protocol
actions, such as read or write.
Packet sampling does not store complete packets but only a
pre-configured fixed size of the overall packet. This limitation
can lead to inaccuracies in identifying the application layer pro-
tocol because parts of the corresponding headers are missing.
For each protocol, we reduce the packet length of the ground-
truth data byte-wise and detect the minimal packet length
required to identify the protocol correctly. All but one protocol
dissector require less than 96 bytes, see Table I. Considering
that packets are truncated after 128 bytes at our vantage points,
we can identify the ICS traffic candidates reliably.
C. Sanitizing ICS Traffic Candidates
We perform three data sanitizing steps to improve data qual-
ity: Ê We remove tunnel traffic so that we only obtain plain
end-to-end traffic. This also excludes ICMP unreachable mes-
sages, which encapsulate the original UDP packets and would
lead to misclassified ICS traffic. Ë We remove packets which
Wireshark marks as malformed or cases in which the dissector
reports an error. This occurs when the protocol detection of a
packet is successful, but the complete dissection fails due to
header fields that do not comply with the protocol specification.
Ì We cross-validate our data by applying NDPI [26], a leading
open-source deep packet inspection software. NDPI detects a
broad range of protocols, but no ICS protocols. We exclude
every packet that NDPI is able to map to a known protocol
since we consider such a packet to be a false positive.
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(a) Internet Exchange Point (IXP)
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(b) Internet Service Provider (ISP)
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(c) Extrapolation by sampling rates.
Figure 3: Number of inter-domain ICS packets per day at two different vantage points.
In Table II, we quantify the remaining packets after applying
our sanitizing steps. The data is shown relatively to the overall
amount of identified ICS packets per vantage point. 85% of
the packets at the IXP are classified malformed, and 48% at
the ISP. This highlights that Wireshark dissectors are rather
optimistic and sanitizing is required for a reliable analysis.
The removal of packets identified by NDPI accounts for less
than 1%, which indicates a very low false-positive rate of our
approach. Finally, we compare our approach with a pure port-
based detection. Identifying ICS traffic only based on port
numbers is not feasible as it leads to significant overestimation.
IV. PROPERTIES OF ICS TRAFFIC
A. Daily Patterns and Prevalence of Inter-Domain ICS Traffic
During our measurement period, we identified 19k ICS
packets at the IXP and 310k ICS packets at the ISP after
sanitization. Figure 3 shows the number of daily ICS packets
at the IXP and ISP. For better comparison, we consider the
different sampling intervals and extrapolate the values (see
Figure 3c). The daily ICS traffic at the IXP and ISP is constant
apart from one anomalous peak at each vantage point. The
traffic peak at the IXP is due to a large number of EthernetIP
packets (217.5 MB/s traffic peak) during 10 minutes on January
3, 2018. The destination is a single IP address and the traffic is
sent from several sources located in two autonomous systems.
The traffic peak at the ISP consists of BACnet messages from
76 source IP addresses to 41,000 destination IP addresses. This
event took place one day before the IXP peak. We observe
uniformly distributed BACnet read messages, which indicates
load balancing between scanning nodes. All sources relate to
Rapid7 Sonar, a company that performs regular Internet-wide
BACnet scans.
Compared to the total traffic volume, ICS inter-domain traffic
is low. ICS packets only account for ≈ 0.0001% of all sampled
packets at the IXP and ≈ 0.002% at the ISP. However, putting
ICS traffic into perspective of well-known non-ICS protocols
that a not heavy hitters, ICS traffic is likewise prevalent, which
we show in Figure 4. To allow for comparability, this graph
visualizes the non-sanitized data set because implementing a
sanitization process for non-ICS protocols would be out of
scope of this work. This result emphasizes that ICS traffic
should not be neglected.
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Figure 4: Protocols ranked by packet frequency as reported
by Wireshark (non-sanitized), observed at a big national IXP
during 6 months. ICS protocols are emphasized among some
well-known protocols. Ranks are noted in brackets.
B. ICS Message Types: Request vs. Reply
We refer to packets sent to a known ICS port as requests,
and packets originating from a known ICS port as replies.
Protocols with balanced request-reply ratios are likely to be
used in a legitimate way since ICS communication patterns
follow a common client server scheme. Observing significantly
enhanced requests may have two reasons: (i) heartbeats sent
from sensors to central servers that do not confirm the recep-
tion; (ii) scan traffic that reaches hosts which do not offer the
corresponding service.
We analyze the ratio of requests and replies per protocol
in more detail in Figure 5 and observe a tendency towards
requests exceeding replies. Only at the IXP, HartIP and C12.12
show a balanced request-reply ratio. Strikingly, BACnet is
very request-heavy across both vantage points. This might be
an indication for non-industrial ICS traffic, which we will
investigate further in Section V.
C. ICS Traffic Sent to and Received from Autonomous Systems
To better understand the ICS ecosystem from a networking
perspective, we map each source and destination IP address of a
sampled packet to autonomous system numbers. We use daily
data from the RIPE RIS project and topological information
from the IXP for assigning ASNs.
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Figure 5: ICS requests and replies. We observe mostly requests, which can indicate non-productive traffic such as scanning.
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Figure 6: Number of ASes sending different ICS protocol
requests. Since ICS deployments are rather specific deployment
and bound to a single manufacturer, we rate several ICS
protocols originating from a single AS as suspicious.
Autonomous systems which are the origin of request traffic
via multiple ICS protocols host either scanners or heteroge-
neous ICS monitoring services. In our data sets, more than
70% of the ASes host nodes that deploy a single ICS protocol,
see Figure 6. We find 4 cases of ASes creating requests for > 4
distinct ICS protocols. Three are eyeball providers and one is
a webhoster. These types of networks are common to connect
scanners.
V. IDENTIFICATION OF INDUSTRIAL AND NON-INDUSTRIAL
ICS TRAFFIC
Separating non-industrial from industrial ICS traffic allows
us to identify the vulnerable part of the ICS ecosystem more
precisely. We classify ICS traffic at our vantage points as non-
industrial if the captured IP addresses have been observed at
honeypots or belong to scan projects, as those indicate non-ICS
hosts.
A. Filter Traffic of Common Scan Projects
Several projects scan for ICS hosts on a regular basis
and thus contribute to non-industrial inter-domain ICS traffic.
The most common projects are Censys, Shodan, Rapid7, and
Kudelski (see Table I). Censys, Rapid7, and Kudelski publicly
Table III: Amount of successful reverse DNS lookups of source
IP addresses per scan project.
IXP ISP
# Unique source IP addresses 1504 223
# Resolvable Censys IP addresses 105 n/a
# Resolvable Rapid7Labs IP addresses 7 56
# Resolvable Kudelski Sec. IP addresses 0 0
# Resolvable Shodan IP addresses 23 25
document the IP prefixes from which they initiate scans. We use
these prefix lists to identify scanners by marking an observed
source IP address as scanner if the source IP address is covered
by one of the prefixes.
To identify scanners that are not part of the documented
IP prefixes, we perform reverse DNS lookups on all source
IP addresses captured at our vantage points. By review-
ing the assigned names manually, we find Censys, Rapid7,
and Shodan scanners (e.g., pirate.census.shodan.io and scan-
ner2.labs.rapid7.com). Note that we cannot identify any names
that relate to Censys at the ISP because Censys performs
scans between ≈ 8:00am and ≈ 6:00pm (UTC), whereas the
ISP dumps include 15 minutes packet captures starting at
5:00am (UTC).
Table III shows the amount of successful reverse DNS
lookups. The IXP and ISP share 86 source IP addresses, pre-
dominantly Shodan and Rapid7 scanners. The 5 most common
source IP addresses at the ISP resolve to Shodan names and
are located in Quasi Networks, an autonomous system which
is also well-known for hosting malicious nodes [27].
B. Filter Traffic of Other Non-ICS Hosts
To account for other hosts that create non-industrial ICS
traffic (e.g., attackers), we leverage data from honeypots. Con-
pot [28] is the de-facto standard ICS honeypot but supports
only five ICS protocols, one currently under development (see
Table I). Conpot implements limited variances in responses,
which makes it easy to unmask as a honeypot. Thus, we argue
to utilise transport layer honeypots in order to measure a broad
scope of activities on ICS ports.
Table IV: Relative amount of industrial ICS traffic after applying different filter rules on the observed ICS traffic.
Excluding scanners Excluding captured honeypot data Excluding both
IXP ISP IXP ISP IXP ISP
HPICS HPall HPICS HPall
Total 97% 46% 97% 96% 15% 1.5% 96% 1.5%
BACnet 15% 7% 25% 11% 40% 1% 10% 1%
C12.22 100% 100% 100% 99% 100% 100% 99% 100%
DNP3 100% 99% 0% 0% 0.4% 0.1% 0% 0%
EthernetIP 99% 75% 98% 98% 5% 0.02% 98% 0%
HartIP 65% 9% 62% 62% 9% 8% 62% 8%
IEC60870 100% 100% 100% 99% 100% 100% 99% 100%
Modbus 100% – 100% 100% – – 100% –
Siemens 100% – 100% 100% – – 100% –
We deploy Honeytrap [29] in (i) a university network and (ii)
a darknet, a network not offering any public services. Based on
these honeypots, we identify suspicious source IP addresses.
We create two lists: HPall, which stores all IP addresses
observed at the honeypots, and a subset of this list, HPICS ,
which stores IP addresses that sent requests to at least one ICS
port. HPall consists of 244k IP addresses and HPICS of only
3700 IP addresses (1.5%) from 619 ASes. It is worth noting
that our honeypots also capture sources of the well-known scan
projects. 224 IP addresses in HPall are from Censys scanners.
We now correlate ICS traffic from our vantage points with
the honeypot data. For every observed ICS packet, we check
whether the source or destination IP address is present in HPall
or HPICS , see Table IV.
At the IXP, the overlap is minimal, which means that a
significant amount of industrial ICS traffic is visible, 96%
industrial ICS traffic based on filtering HPall and 97% based
on filtering HPICS . We perform a comparison per protocol
and correlate 506 BACnet packets with HPall, which represent
89% of the total BACnet packets at the IXP. These packets are
classified as non-industrial ICS traffic and filtered. The results
are stable, even if we only consider HPICS .
At the ISP, less industrial ICS traffic is visible. Filtering
by HPall, we find only 1.5% of the traffic to be industrial.
However, the filtering is less effective if we only consider
HPICS , especially for BACnet. The results indicate that it is
beneficial to include honeypot information from non-ICS ports.
C. Benefits of Combining Filter Rules
To summarize the results from our previous filter steps,
we provide an overview of the impact of the different filters.
Table IV shows the relative amount of ICS traffic that remains
when traffic from scanners (identified by DNS names and IP
prefixes), honeypots, or both is excluded.
While we classify 96% of the traffic at the IXP as industrial,
we see only 1.5% of industrial traffic at the ISP. Interestingly,
more than half of the traffic at the ISP can already be classified
as non-industrial only by excluding public scanners, i.e., with-
out maintaining a dedicated infrastructure such as honeypots.
However, even though maintaining a honeypot introduces ad-
ditional complexity, its data is necessary to provide a more
complete view on distinguishing industrial and non-industrial
traffic.
Inter-domain ICS traffic tends to be either industrial or
non-industrial traffic depending on the ICS protocols. The
substantial difference for EthernetIP is caused by a Shodan
scan of a complete prefix range at the ISP.
We show the effects of filtering non-industrial ICS traffic
over six months in Figure 7. This enables us to describe
the impact of non-industrial traffic over time. At the IXP we
focus on BACnet as this protocol is severely affected by non-
industrial activity. We make two observations: (i) At the IXP,
non-industrial traffic consists mainly of ephemeral spikes at
the beginning of our measurement period. (ii) At the ISP, the
non-industrial traffic shows a very constant daily activity. After
filtering at both vantage points, we obtain only a few industrial
ICS packets per day which allows even for manual inspection
of the ICS traffic.
VI. PROPERTIES OF ICS INDUSTRIAL AND
NON-INDUSTRIAL TRAFFIC
A. Detecting ICS Hosts Protected by Firewalls
ICS devices might be protected by firewalls which grant
access only from specific hosts. We analyze this by comparing
IP addresses observed in our passive data with IP addresses of
ICS devices revealed by active scans. To reduce overhead on
the Internet infrastructure [30], we do not implement our own
active probing but use data from Censys. Censys continuously
scans the entire public IPv4 address space fast [2], [31], im-
plements full transport and application layer handshakes [31],
and releases weekly snapshots. We compare 3 ICS protocols
for which we found industrial traffic and which are scanned by
Censys during our measurement period: Siemens S7, Modbus,
and BACnet.
First, we check how many ICS hosts are detected by Censys
on the transport and application layer (see Table V). Despite
many successful transport layer handshakes, Modbus and S7
exhibit a very low success rate on the application layer. We
argue that this is related to the use of lower port numbers that
are more likely to be used by other applications which listen on
the corresponding port. This complies with our previous results
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(a) IXP – Total BACnet Traffic.
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(c) ISP – Total ICS Traffic.
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(d) ISP – Industrial ICS Traffic.
Figure 7: Daily amount of all ICS traffic versus industrial ICS traffic visible at the IXP and ISP.
Table V: Successful transport and application layer handshakes
during Censys scans.
# ICS hosts detected by Censys
Protocol Transport Scan Application Scan
BACnet 31,735 31,154 (98%)
Modbus 8,400,058 126,984 (2%)
Siemens S7 7,202,828 24,946 (0.5%)
which showed that port-based ICS detection is misleading (see
Section III-C).
Now, we compare with ICS hosts observed at our vantage
points. We compute the fraction of source or destination IP
addresses that have been discovered by Censys (see Table VI)
and for which we see communication in our passive data,
i.e., completely unprotected nodes. At the IXP, 35% of the
Modbus and 65% of Siemens destinations are already known
because of the transport layer scan. At the ISP, we do not find
any correlation, i.e., none of the ICS devices that is visibile in
our ISP traffic traces has been captured by active scans. This
is very likely due to port-based access control lists which only
allow communication between pre-configured hosts.
We find 3 source IP addresses that respond to Modbus
transport layer scans but do not establish successful application
layer sessions based on Censys. However, based on our traffic
traces, each of these hosts has sent about 45 Modbus packets.
One host is sending packets to a solar energy consulting
agency. These results indicate cases of secure ICS services but
unprotected ICS traffic.
B. Host Stability of Industrial ICS Traffic
Host stability describes how often a host is visible at our
vantage points with respect to an activity span. For each
destination IP address in the industrial ICS traffic, we calculate
Table VI: Relative amount of ICS hosts observed at the IXP
and Censys.
% ICS hosts that overlap with Censys
Host Type at IXP Transport Scan Application Scan
BACnet Source 0% 0%
BACnet Destination 0% 0%
Modbus Source 3% 0%
Modbus Destination 35% 0%
Siemens Source 0% 0%
Siemens Destination 65% 65%
the size of the activity window w (i.e., time-lag between first
and last day of occurrence) and the number of active days n
within this time window.
We assume that as soon as an ICS network is in place
an embedded ICS device and an ICS control station will
frequently exchange ICS traffic. Furthermore, we assume static
assignment of IP addresses to those devices as this will ease
operational maintenance (e.g., configuration of firewall rules).
Following both assumptions, hosts will achieve high host
stability in case of real ICS networks, i.e., the same IP address
will appear for several days.
The IXP and ISP results differ significantly. In the IXP
data set, the most stable host communicates almost every day
(w = 179, n = 146). In contrast to this, in the ISP data
set, hosts communicate less than 4%, relatively to the overall
activity span.
To better understand whether stable hosts belong to a real
ICS deployment, we map IP addresses to additional meta data:
recursive DNS records and whois data. Based on this, we find
that hosts are operated by a building company (max-boegl.de;
w = 179, n = 146), a trade and transport company (Handel
Uslugi Transport Ewa Cielica; w = 159, n = 98), and a
Figure 8: Example of cone to cone communi-
cation with ingress AS X and egress AS Y.
Table VII: Relative ratio of traffic transitions for three ICS protocols at IXP.
Non-industrial traffic originates exclusively from cones and thus is not local.
Industrial Non-Industrial
BACnet HartIP EthernetIP BACnet HartIP EthernetIP
Member to Member 30% 22% 5% 0% 0% 0%
Member to Cone 24% 51% 29% 0% 0% 0%
Cone to Member 19% 9% 6% 46% 79% 52%
Cone to Cone 27% 18% 60% 54% 21% 48%
# Flows 59 78 9006 509 48 165
industrial service and consulting company in the field of solar
energy (enerparc.com; w = 90, n = 36). The high number of
active days, despite the sampling, indicates a high exchange of
messages. Interestingly, these hosts are not marked as ICS hosts
by Censys, indicating the role of an ICS monitoring station. In
the data set of our transnational ISP, we do not find evidence
for ICS companies.
C. Locality of Non-Industrial Traffic
We analyze the locality of industrial and non-industrial ICS
traffic. Less local traffic is more likely to be part of Internet-
wide scanning activities, whereas some ICS stakeholders may
consider locality as reason not to protect (industrial) ICS
traffic. We distinguish two types of locality: topological and
geographical locality.
Figure 8 shows a typical inter-domain topology at an IXP. In
addition to a source and destination AS, packets may traverse
separate ingress and egress ASes directly connected at the IXP.
We refer to ASes which send or receive packets over an IXP
member to be in the cone of this member. We refer to traffic as
IXP local, if the following condition applies: SourceAS ==
IngressAS ∧ EgressAS == DestinationAS. From a
topological point of view, IXP local traffic is more trustworthy,
because both ASes peer directly with each other (maybe via
a route server). In contrast to this, communication from cones
is rather expected due to Internet-wide scanners, which are
located in edge networks.
At the IXP, we are able to classify a large amount of traffic
as non-industrial. This traffic belongs to two protocols: BACnet
and HartIP. 90% of the BACnet and 40% of the HartIP traffic
relate to scanning or malicious behavior. Comparing peering
transitions for these two protocols with EthernetIP, a protocol
that exhibits only 2% non-industrial, shows a clear distinction,
see Table VII: Non-industrial traffic originates only from the
cones of the IXP-members, hence is not local at the IXP.
Assuming that critical infrastructures are scanned by ma-
licious hosts that are connected via ASes located in foreign
countries to detect potential victims, we also check how often
traffic is locally bound to a country. We do this by mapping
the source and destination IP addresses to countries and then
compare the country codes. If the source and destination IP
addresses are located in the same country, we call the traffic
domestic. Geo mapping is based on MaxMind [32].
Table VIII: Relative ratio of domestic traffic for three ICS
protocols, compared to the overall traffic of each protocol at
the IXP.
Industrial Non-Industrial
BACnet HartIP EthernetIP BACnet HartIP EthernetIP
29% 24% 1% 0% 0% 0.5%
Table VIII presents the results of our analysis of domestic
traffic. Although industrial traffic is also exchanged across
country borders (which might happen in the case of, e.g., global
transport companies), there is a clear trend for non-industrial
traffic: Non-industrial traffic is strictly non-domestic, which
highlights globally distributed scanning activities. On the other
hand, up to 29% of the industrial traffic is local, which makes it
easy to contact and train the ICS network operators in charge.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we analyzed unprotected traffic of protocols
that interconnect industrial control systems (ICS). We discussed
challenges to identify those protocols and presented measure-
ment results from an IXP and ISP perspective.
We introduced and explored an advanced but lean approach
to detect ICS protocols. Due to the limited deployment of
ICS protocols, there is a lack of fingerprinting tools. Our
methodology is based on common Wireshark dissectors and
introduced several sanitizing steps to reduce the number of
false positives. Given that we have identified ICS scanners as
well as industrial ICS deployments in our traffic traces, we
have trust in our true positives.
Despite our data sanitizing steps, we found over 330k ICS
packets and one anomalous traffic peak at each vantage point.
As Internet-wide ICS scanners operate since several years, it
comes as no surprise that inter-domain ICS traffic exist. This is
why we developed a classification mechanism to differentiate
between industrial and non-industrial ICS traffic. With only
1.5% industrial ICS traffic, the ISP is heavily affected by scan
traffic. The share (96%) of unprotected industrial ICS traffic
at the IXP is alarming. Since it is a regional IXP, cooperating
companies from the same country might exchange ICS traffic.
In contrast to this, our ISP data represents a transnational
link between USA and Japan, representing the bridge between
multiple larger, geographical distributed transit networks.
We presented features of industrial and non-industrial ICS
traffic. First, we showed that our industrial ICS traffic is
exchanged partly by hosts known to the Censys scan project.
But we also discovered previously undetected ICS devices
belonging to real ICS eco-systems. We identified cases of very
stable hosts, i.e., hosts that exchange ICS traffic regularly. Such
hosts are vulnerable to traffic manipulation attacks on a daily
basis. We spotted topological features for non-industrial ICS
traffic. Such traffic originates at IXP-cones and is not domestic,
i.e., source and destination are not located in the same country.
The insights of this paper may help to implement a long-
term monitoring system to detect malicious ICS activities. They
also help to find unprotected ICS traffic and inform responsible
stakeholders to improve the situation. In future work, we will
extend our analysis and incorporate additional data sources, in-
cluding further passive as well as active measurements. We will
also consider more fine grained clustering and classification.
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